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"Hercules is the epitome of the mythical hero, the representative of the
superhuman elements in the makeup of myth : the monster-slayer, the
traveller on extraordinary journeys, giant in strength and stature,
invincible, yet predestined to suffer great ordeals... just as his life bears
the aspirations of humanity to be superhuman, so in the end he fulfils
the hero's other supreme task of expressing an unavoidable destiny"1.
1. Introduction
The Interim Constitution of South Africa which came into effect on 27 April 1994 established
a new law-government relationship characterised by constitutionalism, a relationship which
will be confirmed by the final Constitution. Constitutionalism subordinates the decisions and
actions of a democratically elected legislature to the constitution and the body responsible for
enforcing it.2 In South Africa, this body is the Constitutional Court3. Constitutionalism is a
fundamental element of liberal legal ideology, and a widely accepted model of liberal
democracy, as it is argued that only in this way can certain rights which are fundamental to
the successful operation of a democracy be protected from the transient will of the majority4.
However, in both the African and the South African contexts the merits of constitutionalism
are not that readily accepted. Okoth-Ogendo documents the "emphatic rejection of the
classical notion of constitutionalism"5 by the majority of African states, and Nolutshungu
points out that the idea of constitutionalism was not one "easily found in the discourse of the
South African liberation movement"6. And indeed when the eleven judges on the new South
African Constitutional Court, in the first case before them, unanimously declared the death
penalty unconstitutional7, it provoked a public outcry and wide-spread condemnation of the
decision as undemocratic and contrary to the will of the majority, accompanied by calls for a
'M. Senior, Who's Who in Mythology (London, 1985).
2P.J.J. Olivier, 'Constitutionalism in the New South Africa', in R.A. Licht and B. De Villiers (edsj South
Africa's crisis of constitutional Democracy: Can the US Constitution help ? (Cape Town, 1994).
3Section 98(2) in interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993. Of course, all
courts in South Africa are bound by the constitution as the basic law of the land and will in this way enforce it (e.g.
by ruling that the state had infringed the rights of an accused whose confession was extracted by means of coercion),
but the Constitutional Court is the only court which is empowered to enquire into and pronounce on the
constitutionality of legislation.
4F.H.Willhoite, Power and Governments (California, 1988), pp 123, 127.
5H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, 'Constitutions without constitutionalism : Reflections on an African political
paradox' in I.G. Shivji (ed.) State and Constitutionalism : An African Debate on Democracy (Harare, 1991), p 5.
6S. Nolutshungu, "The Constitutional Question in South Africa' in I.G. Shivji (ed.) State and
Constitutionalism : An African Debate on Democracy (Harare, 1991), pp 93-94.
S v Makwanyane and another CCT 3/94
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referendum on the issue8. This illustrated that a large number of South Africans might not
understand or like the system of constitutionalism, as they believe that democracy means that
the majority gets what it wants. This tension between constitutionalism and popular
democracy is noted by Dennis Davis when he asks : "can it not be argued that a body that has
not been elected, and is not otherwise politically responsible to an electorate, is undermining
democracy by telling a democratically elected body what it can and cannot do ?"9
This paper will argue that there is indeed a tension between constitutionalism and the aims of
popular democracy, and that the commitment to constitutionalism on the part of all the
significant political parties in South Africa is a central feature of the elite-pacted nature of the
transition to democracy. Du Plessis and Corder note the growing enthusiasm, in the late
eighties, for human rights and constitutionalism in National Party (NP) and government
circles, as a result of the realisation that this can be a very effective way of protecting vested
interests during and after the transition10. During the process of negotiations, the model of
democracy proposed by the African National Congress (ANC) changed dramatically from an
emphasis on a strong central state, popular democracy and a high degree of participation, to
a commitment to decentralisation of power, liberal democracy and constitutionalism.
It will also be argued, however, that constitutionalism is not inherently incompatible with
popular democratic ideology, and that it can in fact be a way of broadening the base of popular
participation in government as well as a way of entrenching government accountability,
especially in the arena of human rights. This view of constitutionalism accommodates the
popular democratic demand for a central role for civil society in the process of democratisation
and the subsequent consolidation of democracy11. The purpose of this paper is thus clearly not
to condemn constitutionalism. On the contrary, it is based on an acceptance of the need for
the protection of human rights and the development of a human rights culture in the context
of the heterogeneous and historically strife-torn South African society. There is reason for
concern, however, about the legitimacy of constitutionalism as a system of government in the
eyes of the majority of South Africans, as illustrated by public reaction to the death penalty
decision and other decisions that affect the criminal law12, and it is therefore important to
investigate the possibility of reconciling constitutionalism, as an institution of liberal
democracy, and the aims of popular democracy in South Africa.
A central assumption of this paper is that the solution to the tension between constitutionalism
and popular democratic ideology in South Africa lies in the concept of human rights,
"The Star, 15 February 1995: 5; The Star 28 June 1995 : 16; The Sunday Times, 11 June 1995 : 5; The
Star, 23 September 1996.
9D. Davis "Social Power and Civil Rights : Towards a New Jurisprudence for South Africa' in The South
African Law Journal, 108, 1991, pp 462-463.
10L. Du Plessis and H. Corder, Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (Cape Town,
1994)p 32.
11
 See, e.g. R. Fine 'Civil Society Theory and the Politics of Transition in South Africa' in Review of
African Political Economy, 55, 1991.
12For example the decision that allows accused access to police dockets - Shabalala and others v Attorney-
General (Transvaal) and another CCT23/94.
particularly social and economic rights, as it can expand the base of civil society participation
in government and entrench government accountability, but this will depend on the level of
legal mobilisation13 in civil society and, importantly, on the way in which the Constitution is
interpreted. The South African Constitutional Court has been entrusted with the task of
bringing the Constitution to life, and in the process the Court has the opportunity to entrench
and maintain the new South African democracy. This role of the Court is, however, fraught
with dilemmas, and its success will largely depend on the extent to which the Court balances
the competing requirements of autonomy and accountability : "too much accountability and the
[Court] becomes the tool of the democratic majority; too much autonomy and the [Court] loses
the democratic legitimacy necessary to justify its powerful role"14.
In order to explore this balancing act, Ronald Dworkin invented Hercules, a judge of
"superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen"15. Hercules rejects the idea "that judges
must defer to elected officials, no matter what part of the constitutional scheme is in question"
and will assume that the point of some provisions of the Constitution is to protect democracy,
and of others to protect individuals and minorities against the will of the majority, "and he will
not yield, in deciding what those provisions require, to what the majority's representatives
think is right". On the other hand, Hercules will "refuse to substitute his judgement for that
of the legislature when he believes the issue in play is primarily one of policy rather than
principle", for example when the argument is about the best strategies for achieving the
eradication of poverty16. These are the decisions faced by the South African Constitutional
Court in its attempt to avoid the potential for tyranny or courtocracy inherent in a
constitutional order such as South Africa's. The Court has the power to give effect to the new
democracy and to protect it from abuses by providing an expanded forum for participation and
by entrenching government accountability, but in order to do this it has to balance
accountability to the public and autonomy from vested interests, including those of the
majority. This is the monster that the Court must slay on its extraordinary journey, and the
central focus of this paper is an investigation of the ways in which the Court has addressed this
dilemma in its judgements to date. It will be argued that Hercules' "moral reading"of a
constitution17, which the Court has adopted in its judgements so far, could provide the Court
with its autonomy while ensuring a measure of accountability, but that greater accountability,
defined in a particular way, is essential if the Court is to earn and sustain the legitimacy
needed to play a meaningful role in the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.
2. From parliamentary sovereignty to constitutionalism in South Africa
We have seen a complete metamorphosis of the role of law in the South African state from
13See Mark Kessler "Legal Mobilization for Social Reform : Power and the Politics of Agenda Setting' Law
and Society Review 24/1, 1990
I 4D. Nicholson "Ideology and the South African Judicial Process - Lessons from the Past1 in South
African Journal on Human Rights 8, 1992, p70. ,
15Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London, 1977) plO5.
16Rona!d Dworkin, Law's Empire (London, 1986) p398.
17Ronald Dworkin, "The Moral Reading of the Constitution' in New York Review of Books, March 21,
1996.
parliamentary sovereignty to constitutionalism, and from a flexible and non-supreme
constitution to an inflexible and supreme constitution. This process has mirrored the transition
from autocratic, brutal and repressive government to transparent, accountable and democratic
government.
Okoth-Ogendo conceptualises a constitution as a "power map", which is concerned with the
"creation, distribution, exercise, legitimational effects and reproduction of power"18, and this
power map will determine the distribution of power by inter alia establishing a particular type
of relationship between the legal system and the government. For the purposes of this
discussion, two categories of this relationship can be identified : parliamentary sovereignty
and constitutionalism19. In a law-government relationship of parliamentary sovereignty, the
legal system is subordinate to government. Under this system, "what Parliament says is law,
without the need to offer justification to the courts"20, and the courts simply apply laws made
by the government. Nonet and Selznick argue that this type of relationship between the legal
system and government in a society is often typical of a system of "repressive law" where "the
hallmark of law becomes its association with, and subordination to, the requirements of
government", and courts and legal officials are "pliable instruments of the government in
power"21. In South Africa, law and the legal system played an important role in the
maintenance of oppression and the repression of resistance. The policy of apartheid was
executed largely by means of legislation22, and resistance was suppressed by means of
legislation23 as well as by means of strategies like criminalisation and much-publicised political
trials. The most fundamental element of this process was, however, the principle of
parliamentary sovereignty. The law-government relationship in the South African state at the
time was characterised by complete subordination of the legal system to government. This
principle was fundamental to this era of oppression, as it meant that the courts could not test
any legislation enacted by parliament and had to apply such legislation unquestioningly, which
enabled the state to trample individual liberty without fear of judicial obstruction.
In contrast to this, constitutionalism means that government is subordinate to law and the legal
system, particularly to a constitution as interpreted and enforced by the legal system. Central
to all definitions of constitutionalism is the idea that it refers to a system where the exercise
of power by the government is strictly limited by the constitution, and such limitation is
enforced by an independent and supreme judiciary. In such a system, the constitution will
therefore be a powerful document, which means that it will be inflexible or difficult to amend
and supreme (the highest law of the land); and it will contain explicit rules about the source
and exercise of governmental power. The two categories of parliamentary sovereignty and
constitutionalism clearly represent two strongly contrasting forms of the relationship between
18Okoth-Ogendo, 'Constitutions without constitutionalism... p 5.
l9See F. Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State (New York, 1957) for a discussion of law-
government relationships.
20E. Mureinik, * A Bridge to Where ? Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights' in South African Journal
on Human Rights, 10, 1994, p 32.
21P. Nonet and P. Selznick, Law and Society in Transition : Towards Responsive Law (New York, 1978).
22e.g. the Group Areas Act 41 of 1951 and the Population Registration Act 30 of 1951.
23e.g. the Public Safety Act 3 of 1953.
the legal system and government : in the former, the constitution or power map is seen as one
which facilitates the exercise of state power, and in the latter, the constitution places limits on
the exercise of such power.
3. The tension between popular democracy and constitutionalism
The debate about what democracy really is, divides theorists into two broad categories which
have been given many different labels : individualist, liberal, representative or Western vs
collectivism nonliberal, participatory, people's or popular democracy24. At the risk of over-
simplification, liberal democratic ideology can briefly be described as individualistic, aimed
at limiting the power of the state, and based on representation, while popular democratic
ideology is collectivistic, aimed at eradicating inequality, a function usually seen as best
performed by a powerful state, and based on participation25, which is why contemporary
theorists of democracy in Africa emphasise the importance of the role of civil society in
successful democratisation and the consolidation of democracy26. The difficulties which beset
attempts at reconciling the two can be seen as the result of the apparently conflicting ethical
foundations of the two traditions of democratic ideology : the ethical foundation of liberal
democracy is a particular conception of individual freedom, and that of popular democracy is
similarly a particular conception of social equality27.
Constitutionalism can be seen as the legal basis of liberal democracy, as it is aimed at limiting
the power of the state and operates to protect the interests of individuals and minorities from
the will of the majority, and in this way gives effect to freedom as the ethical foundation of
liberal democracy. A constitution which organises societal power relations along popular
democratic lines will provide for a powerful state (legally, at any rate) and will be aimed
specifically at empowering the state to eradicate inequality (so providing for equality as the
ethical foundation of popular democracy). In the case of the United States, for example, the
constitution is often described as an attempt to entrench elite rights to private property and free
enterprise, and in this way to limit the power of a democratically elected government by
protecting the rights of numerical minorities against it28, while the constitutions of states
newly emerged from oppressive colonial rule are often aimed at providing the government with
the power to eradicate inequality and therefore do not protect the rights of elites (e.g. property
owners) against the state29.
Liberal democracy in general, and therefore constitutionalism in particular, are criticised for
24M.N. Hagopian, Ideals and Ideologies of Modern Politics (New York, 1985); K. Graham, The Battle
of Democracy : Conflict, Consensus and the Individual (1986); I.G. Shivji, State and Constitutionalism : An
African Debate on Democracy (Harare, 1991).
25M.N. Hagopian, Ideals...
26e.g. R. Fine, Civil Society Theory...
2 7C. Gould, Rethinking Democracy (Cambridge, 1988) p 3.
28M. Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York, 1983) p 72.
29M.Chaskalson, 'Should there be a Property Clause ?' Paper presented at the Land, Property Rights
and the New Constitution Conference, Sanbonani, May 1993.
being "democracy for the few"30 : Barber argues that "an excess of liberalism has undone
democratic institutions"31 and he joins a large number of theorists32 who have identified the
failure of liberal democracy to allow substantial political participation. Liberal democracy is
described as "thin democracy", as it is unable to realise the central values of democracy,
namely participation, citizenship and political activity33. In addition, Parenti argues that
constitutionalism, as a central institution of liberal democracy, can operate to entrench elite
rights to private property and free enterprise and thus to limit the power of a democratically
elected government by protecting the rights of numerical minorities against it34.
In contrast to this, popular democracy emphasises participation by civil society in democratic
processes. In an often cited speech, Murphy Morobe of South Africa's United Democratic
Front argued, in 1987, that the "democratic aim" of the liberation movement was not merely
to secure the right "to vote for a central government every four of five years", but "control
over every aspect of our lives", from "national policy to housing, from schooling to working
conditions, from transport to consumption of food". The liberation struggle is therefore about
"direct as opposed to indirect political representation, mass participation rather than passive
docility and ignorance, a momentum where ordinary people feel that they can do the job
themselves, rather than waiting for their local MP to intercede on their behalf"35. This view
of democracy sees meaningful participation by organisations of civil society in democratic
processes as central. A 1995 survey of Cosatu union members indicates strong and enduring
support for this view of democracy, as workers supported a "bottom up notion of democracy"
which requires members of Parliament to operate on a direct mandate from their supporters
on all issues that affect the supporters, to report back to supporters on decisions made in
Parliament, and to be subject to recall by dissatisfied supporters36. Finally, a 1995 survey
conducted by CASE37 indicates that 64% of South Africans want to be part of the process of
drawing up a constitution, and 73 % of the respondents indicated that they would attend a local
meeting about the Constitutional Assembly, responses that indicate a participatory notion of
democracy.
A second element of popular democratic ideology is its focus on the eradication of inequality.
Liebenberg points out that "the struggle for political liberation in South Africa was inextricably
linked to a struggle for the material conditions of a dignified human existence", and this is
clearly reflected in the ANC's 1988 "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South
Africa", which proposed that "the state and all social institutions should be placed under a
constitutional duty to eradicate the social and economic inequalities produced by apartheid"38.
30Parenti, Democracy...
3 IB. Barber, Strong Democracy (California, 1984) pxi.
32e.g. C. Gould, Rethinking...; C. Pateman Participation and Democratic Theory (1970).
33Barber, Strong Democracy...
34Parenti, Democracy... p72.
35Cited in Shivji, State and Constitutionalism... pp37-38.
3 6D. Ginsburg et al., Taking Democracy Seriously (Durban, 1995) pp 44-45.
37CASE, Bringing the Constitution and the People Together (Johannesburg, 1995).
38S. Liebenberg, Social Rights in the Constitution : Toward Effective Equality for Women in South Africa,
Unpublished paper 1995.
This theme is also central to the ANC's Reconstruction and Development Programme, which
states that reconstruction and development can provide the social and economic empowerment
essential to the consolidation of democracy39. The 1995 CASE survey again confirms the
importance of this element of popular conceptions of democracy, as 57% of the respondents
indicated that social and economic rights are the most important rights to be included in the
final Constitution. It is in this arena that popular democratic ideology emphasises the role of
a powerful state in the redistribution of resources required if inequality is to be eradicated, but
this should not be seen as a contradiction of the popular democratic emphasis on civil society
participation. Contemporary popular democratic ideology provides for a "dual-track strategy
involving both state and civil society"40.
It is clear that there is a tension between constitutionalism as an institution of liberal
democracy and the aims of popular democracy and it is important to investigate the reasons
for the central role it nonetheless assumed in the South African transition.
4. The South African transition and constitutionalism
The shape of a post-apartheid, democratic South Africa was negotiated by reformers in the
ruling regime and moderates in the liberation movement, and the transition is thus one
characterised by "pacts between adversarial elites"41. If measured against the vision of
democracy represented in the liberation movement, the transition in South Africa has resulted
in a considerably shrunken form of democracy. Adler and Webster42 point out that "while
activists bravely accept that half a loaf may be better than none, few started out with this goal
in mind". This "half a loaf" is the result of the process of elite-pacting which brought about
the transition, and which apparently inevitably requires concessions by pro-democratic forces.
Transition theorists argue that this is inevitable as most parties to the negotiations soon realize
that an insistence on radical democracy threatens the transition process as a whole and that
it risks "provoking an antidemocratic reaction", which could plunge the country into a state
of chaos. In this view, thin democracy i.e. liberal democracy, constitutionalism and the
protection of elite interests, is the only possible outcome of a transition : for a democratic
transition to succeed, "democracy itself must be limited"43. In the South African context of
ethnic diversity and polarization, ethnically-based nationalist movements add impetus to the
drive towards liberal democracy and a constitutional state based on human rights, as it is
argued that "the politics of ethnicity... can be defused by the construction of institutions of
a civic state"44.
39ANC, Reconstruction and Development Plan (1994) p 121.
40Fine, Civil Society Theory... p 72.
41G.Adler and E.Webster, 'Challenging Transition Theory : The Labor Movement, Radical Reform and
Transition to Democracy in South Africa' in Politics and Society, 23/1, 1995, p 84.
42ibid,p83.
43Przeworski in Adler and Webster, Challenging... p 84.
^R.Wilson, 'The Sizwe will not go away : the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Human Rights and
nation-building in South Africa', paper based on public lecture presented at the Institute for African Studies,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, p 4.
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This paper argues that the notion of constitutionalism constitutes a crucial element of the elite-
pacted transition to democracy in South Africa. The emergence of the notion of
constitutionalism as the preferred law-government power relationship in a post-apartheid South
Africa has, however, not been documented and analysed. Sam Nolutshungu argues that the
national liberation movement in South Africa always encompassed the idea that "liberation
must lead to a new constitution that transfers power from the ruling oligarchy to the people
at large, or that extends citizenship and political rights from the minority to all members of
the population", and that will provide and protect fundamental human rights, but that the
content of these rights and the mechanisms by which they would be protected were not the
subjects of "elaborate debate". Furthermore, although the commitment to fundamental rights
was very strong, the idea of constitutionalism, defined as the idea that the constitution itself,
"rather than political arrangements, behaviour and culture", will ultimately protect these
fundamental rights, was not one "easily found in the discourse of the South African liberation
movement"45. Davis also points out that as constitutionalism is seen as an important element
of liberal democratic ideology, it was met with considerable suspicion in the popular or
socialist democratic ideology of the liberation movement46.
The following is a brief account of the more important moments in the evolution of the final
South African constitution, and it indicates the need for more thorough research particularly
on the interests that impacted on the process of constitutional negotiations and how those
resulted in the constitutionalist outcome of this process. The emergence of the notion of
constitutionalism effectively illustrates the shift in ANC thinking during the negotiations
process, as well as the extent of elite-pacting that underlies the transition to democracy in
South Africa.
In 1988 the ANC published its "Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa", a
document which was to convert the "vision for the future" embodied in the Freedom Charter
into a "constitutional reality"47. The Freedom Charter, adopted in 1955 by the Congress of
the People at Kliptown near Johannesburg, was the result of months of wide consultation with
a cross-section of the South African population. Corder and Davis argue that by the
mid-1980's the Freedom Charter enjoyed "wide-ranging approval in all sectors of South
African society", but by then it had become important to the ANC to indicate more clearly
what the Freedom Charter would mean in practice, and a process of re-examination and
reformulation of its constitutional demands was launched at the Kabwe Consultative
Conference of 1985. This process, which was characterized by intensive discussion in all parts
of the ANC, culminated in a draft document analysed and debated by the leadership and legal
experts of the ANC at a Lusaka seminar in March 1988, which in turn resulted in the
publication, in August 1988, of the ANC's Constitutional Guidelines48.
45Nolutshungu, The Constitutional Question... pp 92-94.
46D. Davis, 'Post-Apartheid South Africa : What Future fora Legal System ?' Acta Juridica, 1987, pp
224-225.
4 7ANC,' Constitutional Guidelines for a Democratic South Africa' in the South African Journal on
Human Rights, 5, 1989.
48H. Corder and D. Davis, vThe Constitutional Guidelines of the ANC : A Preliminary Assessment' in
The South African Law Journal, 106/1, p 635.
The Constitutional Guidelines were criticized by some observers as a "recipe for betrayal"
which was aimed at appeasing "the liberal bourgeoisie, the representatives of international
finance capital"49, and as a less convincing democratic vision than the Freedom Charter inter
alia because of its lack of a "more radical vision of South Africa's longer-term economic
future"50. However, the document represented a notion of a South African democracy which,
particularly when compared to the final outcome of the transition, remained relatively faithful
to the vision of the Freedom Charter. Much was still to change during the following few
years. In 1990, then State President F.W. de Klerk unbanned the ANC, PAC and the SACP
and released political prisoners including Nelson Mandela. The process of multi-party
negotiations to plan for the transition and the new constitution started in 1991 when the
Conference on a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) was set up. Although this process
eventually broke down, the "Declaration of Intent" signed by all parties (except for the
Bophuthatswana Government) in 1991 and reaffirmed in 1992 already appears as a model of
liberal democracy, with an emphasis on constitutionalism and classic civil and political rights
and no mention of participation and equality.
Official, public and representative negotiations resumed in March 1993, in the form of the
Multi-Party Negotiations Process (MPNP), and by June the basic process for the drafting and
adoption of a new Constitution for South Africa had been established : the MPNP would draft
and adopt an Interim Constitution to form the basis of government after the elections in April
1994 and until this elected, representative body in its capacity as the Constitutional Assembly
had drafted a final Constitution. The Interim Constitution would, however, contain a number
of Constitutional Principles from which the new Constitution would not be allowed to deviate.
The Interim Constitution entrenched the basic principles of liberal democracy and
constitutionalism, particularly the supremacy of the constitution which formally shifts power
from the legislature and the executive to the judiciary. It also entrenched the right to private
property and did not cater for significant second- and third-generation rights. The Interim
Constitution thus represented a dramatic shift in ANC thinking from the popular democratic
ideology of the Freedom Charter and Constitutional Guidelines to liberal democratic ideology.
The ANC's Constitutional Guidelines51 provides that "[sovereignty shall belong to the people
as a whole and shall be exercised through one central legislature, executive and
administration", while the Interim Constitution shifts this power to the judiciary, an institution
which is not even mentioned in the Guidelines. Contrary to the popular democratic ideology
of the liberation movement, the Interim Constitution is a monument to liberal democracy, and
this clearly indicates the degree of elite-pacting which informed its drafting, particularly in the
light of the enthusiasm of the National Party, Democratic Party and capital for
constitutionalism.
5. Can constitutionalism be reconciled with popular democracy ?
A central assumption of this paper is that constitutionalism is not inherently incompatible with
49L.Mqotsi, 'ANC's Constitutional Guidelines : A Recipe for Betrayal' in Frontline Worker, 1988 p 14.
50D.Glaser, 'Democracy, Socialism and ihe Future* in Work in Progress, 56/57, 1988, p 30.
5IANC, Constitutional Guidelines... p 130.
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popular democratic ideology, as long as it can be disentangled, in practice, from its reputation
as an institution of liberal democracy aimed at protecting elite interests from the claims of the
masses. Popular democratic ideology does not demand that parliament is supreme, as there
are no guarantees that parliament will in practice be the voice of the people, but that the state
sets about doing what the disadvantaged majority wants it to do, which is to eradicate
inequality and expand popular participation in policy formulation. Democracy in South Africa
is expected to resolve the conflicts that persist in civil society, satisfy the aspirations of
ordinary people demanding a say in the running of the new South Africa, and accommodate
"the demands emanating from civil society for greater equality at the social, economic and
political levels"52. The Constitutional Court and constitutionalism can play a role in the
achievement of this.
The site for the reconciliation of constitutionalism with the aims of popular democracy is the
concept of human rights. A Bill of Rights protects fundamental human rights and in this way
establishes the respect for life and dignity and tolerance of diversity essential to a democratic
culture, and provides the rights to freedom of expression, free and fair political activity and
freedom of association which are essential to legitimate opposition and truly competitive
elections. This is, however, not enough. Popular democratic ideology demands, more than
civil and political rights, a government which can effect the redistribution of resources which
is often the focus of struggles which establish popular democracies, which means that a
representative and legitimate Bill of Rights in the context of a popular democracy has to
include social and economic rights. As Liebenberg points out, "there is clearly no automatic
relationship between legal rights and social benefit to the most disadvantaged in society", but
the opportunities for such groups to obtain redress for social and economic disadvantage can
be maximised by providing a legal channel in addition to the political. A justiciable Bill of
Rights which includes social and economic rights can therefore in effect expand the
opportunities for political participation by disadvantaged groups as well as provide a forum
where the "justifiability of government action or inaction to address the social and economic
priorities of disadvantaged groups can be tested"53. A Bill of Rights which guarantees all three
generations of rights, i.e. political and civil rights, social, economic and cultural rights, and
rights to development and of minorities, can ensure the development and protection of a human
rights culture fundamental to a democratic society, guarantee the conditions for truly
democratic political activity, and facilitate the attainment of substantive race, class and gender
equality. The only way in which such a Bill of Rights can survive is by establishing a
law-government relationship characterised by constitutionalism, as government, which is after
all a body constituted for the purpose of exercising power, cannot be the judge of whether its
own actions and legislation conform to a Bill of Rights54. In this way, constitutionalism can
provide opportunities for the expanded role of civil society in democratic processes and
entrench government accountability.
The realisation of this potential will, however depend on the level of mobilisation in civil
52Ginsburg et al., Taking Democracy Seriously... p 104.
"Liebenberg, Social Rights... p3.
54J.M. Didcott, 'Practical Workings of a Bill of Rights' in J. Van der Westhuizen and H. Viljoen (eds.)
A Bill of Rights for South Africa (Durban, 1988) p 53.
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society as well as on the way in which the Constitution is interpreted. Adler and Webster
argue that "a mobilized civil society and powerful social movements"55 can play a meaningful
role in the consolidation of a kind of democracy that can satisfy many of the aspirations of
popular democracy. Civil society can be defined as "the codeword for the associational life
of a society that exists somewhere between the individual actions of each person (.. .the private
realm) and the organisations and institutions constituted by the state (or public realm)". Civil
society is where "ordinary everyday citizens who do not control the levers of political and
economic power, have access to locally-constituted voluntary associations that have the
capacity... to influence and even determine the structure of power and the allocation of
material resources"56. This presupposes a civil society which is organised and mobilised to
play such a role in societal power relations, as well as a power structure which allows room
for such a role for organisations of civil society. The Constitutional Court itself has the
potential to become a powerful forum for participation in political processes by disadvantaged
and marginalised groups. The Constitutional Court's lenient requirements for locus standi
provides the basis for such participation, but the realisation of this potential will to a large
extent depend on the interpretation of the Constitution by the judges on the Court. As pointed
out earlier, setting up the Bill of Rights and the Constitutional Court only provides form, and
the substance of the Bill of Rights lies in its interpretation. As Parenti and other commentators
on the US Supreme Court have noted, a Bill of Rights can all too easily become like the Bible,
which "the devil himself can quote ... for his own purposes"57. The South African Bill of
Rights can only be a legitimate representative of the aspirations of the majority of South
Africans if it is interpreted by the Court in a way which makes it so.
6. The interpretation of a constitution
The interpretation of legal texts, and particularly constitutions, has been documented and
debated by countless legal scholars, but has only fairly recently become the focus of social
scientists. The debate over interpretation long focused on the degree to which there is an
independent, stable meaning of a legal text, like a statute, which can be found if certain rules
of interpretation are adhered to, and to what extent the interpreter of a statute needs to take
factors external to the text into account. At the risk of over-simplification, two categories of
opinion can be identified in this debate. The literal or textual approach to interpretation is
based on the assumption that legal text is stable in the sense that there is one true meaning
locked up in the text, and that this meaning can be found by adhering to certain rules of
interpretation and ignoring all factors external to the text itself. This can be distinguished
from the more purposive, contextual approach to interpretation, which is based on the
assumption that there is no one true meaning to be found and that the result of interpretation
will largely depend on what the interpreter brings to the process as well as factors external to
the text. Examples of such factors are the purpose of the legislature, the context of the
legislation, and social and political policy considerations58.
55Adler and Webster, Challenging... pp 76-77.
56Fine, Civil Society Theory... p 72.
57Parenti, Democracy... p307
58C.J. Botha, Statutory Interpretation (Cape Town, 1991) p 13.
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The first approach has been criticised widely, particularly for its potential to produce
procedural justice at the expense of substantive justice. Intellectual trends and movements like
Critical Legal Studies (CLS), postmodern legal theory, and literary theory applied to legal
texts, have led to a widespread acceptance of the instability of legal texts59, or the notion that
there is no one true meaning contained in a stable legal text, but that it is a matter of
interpretation which rests on a variety of factors external to the text itself. This has caused
constitutional interpretation to become one of the more controversial elements of
constitutionalism, as it vests great power in the judges who are entrusted with the task of
proclaiming the "true" meaning of the Constitution and rule accordingly. Dworkin provides
examples of this controversy from the American context, where it usually manifests itself in
debates over activist vs passivist judges. Passive judges, so the argument goes, "show great
deference to the decisions of other branches of government, which is statesmanlike", while
active judges "declare these decisions unconstitutional whenever they disapprove of them,
which is tyranny"60. Several American presidents have thus promised the electorate that they
will appoint passive judges to the Supreme Court, as these judges will leave the Constitution
alone and respect rather than defy the people's will61. Dworkin argues that such politicians
are often disappointed, because the distinction between active and passive judges is a false one
as interpretation is always constructive. He defines "constructive interpretation" as a "matter
of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible example
of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong". This does not mean that an interpreter
can make of an object or practice anything s/he wants it to be, because the history or shape
of it "constrains the available interpretations" : constructive interpretation is "a matter of
interaction between purpose and object"62. Applied to a Bill of Rights, this means that an
interpreter of the text will, within the constraints of the history (including the social context)
and shape (including the structure, contents and purpose) of the document, impose on it a
purpose in order to make of it the best possible example of this type of document. This means
that interpretation will depend on the interpreter's view of the history and social context of the
Bill of Rights, the particular view of the shape of it, and, very importantly, the view of what
constitutes the best example of this type of document. This view of the process of
constitutional interpretation makes it clear that factors external to the constitutional text itself
have a fundamental impact on the result of interpretation.
But what is the basis for constructing the constitution ? Dworkin elsewhere calls this a "moral
reading" of a constitution63. The moral reading does not mean that judges have absolute power
to impose their own ideas on the public. The constitution expresses "abstract moral
requirements", and the moral reading thus "brings political morality into the heart of
constitutional law". The moral reading of a constitution involves identifying moral principles
underlying the words of the constitution, including the intention of framers to do so. It takes
into account the history of constitutional practice, including precedent, and it takes into
account the structure of the entire constitution. This makes it clear that only certain
59K.L. Scheppele, 'Legal Theory and Social Theory' in Annual Review of Sociology (California, 1994).
Dworkin, Law's Empire p 369.
61Dworkin, The Moral Reading... p 47.
62Dworkin, Law's Empire p 52.
63Dworkin, The Moral Reading...
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interpretations are possible when law as integrity64 is observed, as only one interpretation will
place the constitution, democracy and the nation in the best possible light, and every judge has
to know when to rely on his or her own judgement about that65. The moral reading thus
clearly condemns both the "passivist" judge who assumes that a constitution grants citizens
no rights except concrete rights that flow uncontroversially from the language alone, as this
does not fit with existing constitutional culture and the "activist"judge who ignores text,
history, precedent, and traditions of political culture, and imposes personal views of what
justice demands on the public66.
The central assumption of this argument is that a constitution can only be interpreted with
reference to certain principles external to the constitution itself. The analysis is critical in the
sense that it investigates the often hidden or denied external factors which impact on legal and,
particularly, constitutional intepretation. It is not, however, critical in the sense that it
disapproves of this element of constitutional interpretation. On the contrary, it is assumed that
constitutional interpretation can only be a creative and dynamic process on this basis. This
argument is supported by Davis67 who points out that in order to identify the political ideals
that fashion and give content to the South African Bill of Rights, and to justify their powers
of review, the judges on the Constitutional Court have to engage in an exercise of political
theory. Acknowledgement and critical analysis of the factors that impact on the process of
interpretation is, however, essential, as a pretension to "neutrality" can be dangerous in the
sense that it could facilitate the undetected operation of a hidden agenda and "on the whole,
those lawyers who are unconscious of their legal ideology are apt to do more harm than their
conscious colleagues"68. It is therefore important to identify the external factors that impact
on constitutional interpretation. These factors impact on interpretation both in the process of
the judge constructing a personal set of principles of constitutional interpretation, and in the
process of applying that set of principles to each case. This argument does not suggest that
these processes are arbitrary, and it does not suggest that constitutional interpretation is
necessarily subject to an individual judge's personal whim, tastes and political opinions
(although a commentator like Parenti69 would argue that it often is the case). It does, however,
indicate an element of constitutionalism which could militate against its claims to legitimacy.
7. Dilemma of the Court: Accountability v Autonomy
Such legitimacy can only be established if the Court succesfully addresses the dilemma of
accountability v autonomy. The Court has explicitly adopted a moral reading of the
Constitution and has on that basis proclaimed its autonomy from specific interests. It has also
in many judgements indicated an awareness of the requirement of accountability, and has
wSee Dworkin, Law's Empire.
65Dworkin, Moral Reading... pp 46-48.
66Dworkin, Law's Empire pp 371, 377-378.
67D. Davis, 'Democracy - It's influence upon the Interpretation of the Constitution' in South African
Journal on Human Rights, 10,. 1994.
68Friedman in G. Barrie, "The Challenge of the SA Judiciary in the 1990V in Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg, 4, 1989, p 518.
69Parenti, Democracy...
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attempted to claim a measure of it.
The dominant reasoning of the Court has been that the Constitution was drafted by means of
legitimate and representative negotiations by representatives of all the people of South Africa
and that it is therefore an expression of the general will, and that their decisions on the basis
of the Constitution are accountable to the public in that way. There are two important
difficulties with this argument. I have argued elsewhere70 that the Constitutional Assembly
(CA) and the process of the writing of the final constitution were, instead of an attempt to let
"the people" actually write the Constitution, central elements in strategies aimed at
establishing the legitimacy of the outcome of the transition and promoting national unity. The
main threats to the consolidation of liberal democracy in South Africa, namely ethnic
nationalism, elite discontent, grassroots militance, and powerful organisations of civil society,
were addressed by attempts to create, consolidate and legitimise a civic state characterised by
constitutionalism, and the Constitutional Assembly and writing of the final Constitution played
a crucial role in this process. The main objective of the CA was to "produce a consensus
constitution that reflects the concerns and values of as broad a cross-section of both the
political spectrum and society as a whole as possible", and it was to accomplish this by
launching the largest public participation programme in the history of South Africa71. The
emphasis on participation was a clear attempt to legitimise the outcome of the transition as
embodied in the Constitution : as Hassen Ebrahim, Executive Director of the CA pointed out,
"the legitimacy of the constitution lies in ownership of it by the people"72. In particular,
popular participation in the writing of the final Constitution was aimed at lending legitimacy
to constitutionalism. One of the CA slogans, "You've made your mark, now have your say"73,
for example, clearly implies that "you" will write the new Constitution, and if it contains
"your" opinions and values, constitutionalism doesn't really diminish popular power and
participation. However, it appears that the Constitution is not particularly representative of
the attitudes and values of ordinary South Africans, as submissions to the CA and opinions
expressed in the media indicate a rejection of abortion, strong opposition to pornography and
strong support for the death penalty, all of which will be thwarted by the new Constitution.
The second difficulty with this claim to accountability is that, as pointed out earlier, the
interpretation of the Constitution, and particularly of the Bill of Rights, can never be a
"neutral" or "objective" process, and each judge on the Constitutional Court will employ an
own particular set of values in terms of which to interpret and enforce the Constitution.
Judges are instructed by the interim Constitution (in Section 35) to apply certain values in the
process of interpretation, but individual judges will understand these concepts differently, and
each judge's understanding will be determined by his/her values. What does "freedom" mean?
And "ubuntu"?
70E. Van Huyssteen, 'By the people, for the people ? The SA Constitutional Assembly and the writing of
the final Constitution', paper presented at the SASA Conference Durban, July 1996.
71
 Constitutional Assembly, Adoption Day, 1996, CA Home Page on the WWW at
http://www.constitution.org.za
"Constitutional Assembly, Annual Report, 1996, CA Home Page...
"Constitutional Talk, Special Newspaper Supplement, 1995.
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Nicholson identifies three sets of values which will impact on a judge's interpretation of the
Constitution74. The first is "societal" values. These values include ideas about what exactly
concepts like democracy, freedom and equality entail. A judge's notion of "democracy", for
example, can have a fundamental impact on the process of interpretation, as it will determine
what the judge considers to be a reasonable and justifiable limitation on a right in a democratic
society. Similarly, a judge's notion of "equality" will determine his or her judgement on
issues of affirmative action or quota systems. The limitations clause also provides that a right
cannot be limited in such a way that the "essential content" of the right in question is negated.
Woolman argues that the essential content of a right is negated when the limitation oh the right
makes it "impossible for the right to serve its intended social function"75, and this is clearly
once again a judgement which will depend on the judge's view of the "intended social
function" of a particular right, for example the right to freedom of expression. If a judge sees
the social function of this right as promoting a forum of ideas in order to uplift society, he/she
may well not tolerate pornography.
The second category of values is "legal values". South African judges traditionally have
Western liberal or bourgeois legal values, which stress "justice, fairness, equality, human
dignity and personal freedom, while presenting law and the courts as the champion of the
individual against the state". These values have, of course, to a large extent been incorporated
into the Constitution, and the extent to which each judge adheres to these legal values will
certainly influence the process of interpretation. When considering a limitation of the right
to freedom of expression in the interest of the state, for example, a judge who is a passionate
proponent of these liberal legal values will tend to require a greater degree of justification from
the state than another.
Nicholsons' third category refers to values about the role and functions of judges in the legal
system and in society, and this also includes a judge's theory of interpretation. This set of
values will determine whether a judge employs a literal approach to the interpretation of
legislation, which usually means assigning minimum relevance and importance to the social
context of legislation, or a more contextual or purposive approach which enables a judge to
consider the purpose or context of legislation. Certain judges believe in considering a wide
range of sources and authority in the process of interpretation, including factors like the
history, social context, purpose and spirit of legislation, and in this way can come to creative
conclusions. In the context of the Constitutional Court's interpretation of the constitutional
text, these values will have an important impact on how each individual judge interprets the
Constitution. The Constitution does prescribe an explicitly contextual and purposive approach
to interpretation, and this will have a profound impact on an individual judge's interpretation
of the text, but individual judicial values will have an influence on how this applies in practice.
This discussion creates the impression that the process of interpretation of the South African
Constitution will be determined entirely by the individual judges' societal, legal and judicial
values. However, the judges of the Constitutional Court have demonstrated a sensitivity to
74D. Nicholson, 'Ideology and the South African Judicial Process...
7 5S. Woolman, * Riding the Push-me Pull-you : Constructing a test that reconciles the conflicting
interests which animate the limitation clause' in South African Journal on Human Rights, 10, 1994, p 74.
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the tension between their role and the requirements of the new democratic dispensation, and
this will also have an influence on the principles of constitutional interpretation which they will
construct as well as the way in which they apply these in each case. In this process, they will
have to face the competing requirements of accountability and autonomy.
A completely autonomous Court will simply interpret the Constitution in terms of its principles
and with regard only to factors connected to it, like its history and spirit. This will result in
the desired end of protecting individual rights against abuse at all costs, but if the Court's
decisions continuously contradict the will of the majority and no attempt at justification is
made, the Court will lose the legitimacy needed if it is to play any role in the consolidation of
democracy in South Africa. Mureinik argues that the new Constitution provides the basis for
a new "culture of justification - a culture in which every exercise of power is expected to be
justified"76. He is referring to exercise of government power, but the same can be argued in
the case of the Court's exercise of its power. A measure of accountability is essential if the
Court is to be seen as legitimate in a new democratic dispensation.
Cameron points out that "there are nuances to accountability : in the democratic sense one
cannot simply regard accountability as subjugation to the popular will from moment to
moment"77. If accountability on the part of the Constitutional Court does not mean handing
down judgements that faithfully reflect the will of the majority, what does it mean ? How can
it be ensured ? Dugard emphasises the importance of public scrutiny and criticism of judicial
decision-making, and argues that the media and the legal profession should play a leading role
in this process78. To this end, it is important that judgements are well motivated and well
publicised. Nicholson argues that the Constitutional Court should, in the process of making
a decision, consider the evidence of non-legal experts like social scientists on the values and
attitudes of the public, as well as hear the arguments which are representative of public opinion
and "listen to the views of those likely to be affected by their decisions"79. Finally, Cameron
believes that the Court should maintain "a constant sensitivity to the overall goals which the
[Constitution] is designed to serve"80, which means that the Court can be accountable to the
people of South Africa by promoting the Constitutional goal of creating an open and
democratic society based on freedom and equality. This argument again does not take into
account the possibility that the judges' interpretation of such a society may well differ
substantially from that of the majority of South Africans.
These measures to ensure accountability are contained in the moral reading of the Constitution
as advocated by Dworkin. This reading does, after all, require a judge to read the Constitution
as a whole and in the context of the democracy which created it. It would appear, however,
that the judges' reading of the new South African democracy and its political culture and
76E. Mureinik, "A bridge to where..., p32.
"E . Cameron, 'Judicial Accountability in Practice' in A. Du Toit (ed.) Towards Democracy: Building a
culture of accountability in South Africa (IDASA, 1991) p 183.
78J. Dugard, "Ideals of Democratic Accountability and the Judiciary' in A. Du Toit (ed.) Towards
Democracy... pp 180-181.
79Nicholson, 'Ideology... p 71.
80E. Cameron, Judicial Accountability... pp 196-197.
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practices is not one shared by the majority of South Africans. Hercules has no need for
justification of his decisions, but in the South African context of a fragile transition and a
process of consolidating democracy, the Court needs to account for its reading of the
Constitution and for its decisions on that basis.
The judgements handed down by the Court to date reflect the judges' sensitivity to the tension
between their role and the requirements of the newly established democratic dispensation, as
well as the way in which they grapple with popular democratic ideology. Several of the
Court's judgements since its establishment have indicated both great courage and a
commitment to meaningful democracy81, but Cockrell82 warns against the danger to the Court
of getting tied up, in an attempt to justify its decisions, in "wishy-washy statements of
'rainbow jurisprudence"' at the expense of the development of a "rigorous jurisprudence of
substantive reasoning" which would allow them to weigh up competing values rationally and
fairly. He does, however, identify several instances of such rigorous substantive reasoning
in the work of some of the judges, and this points to the possibility of the Court becoming a
forum for meaningful participation.
838. Hercules on Olympus
The judges on the Constitutional Court have explicitly adopted a moral reading of the
Constitution, which means that they construct the Constitution on the basis of its structure and
text as well as its history, spirit and context, and on the basis of their interpretation of South
African political culture and practice. They have demonstrated an awareness of the need to
balance autonomy with accountability, and attempt to locate this balancing act in their moral
reading of the Constitution. The focus of this paper is to investigate the ways in which they
construct this reading of the Constitution as well as how they justify, firstly, the moral
reading, secondly, their power, and thirdly, the content of their decisions. In other words,
on which basis do they claim legitimacy ? How are they doing on the autonomy-accountability
scale ?
The Constitutional Court's judgements so far indicate that they attempt to justify their
approach to interpretation or the moral reading, their power, and the content of their decisions
on four fundamental and interlinked bases, each of which is central to Dworkin's
understanding of the moral reading of a constitution. The first of these bases of justification
is the text of the constitution. The text of the Constitution in this sense includes its preamble
and postscript, interpretation (s35) and limitations (s33) clauses as well as the sections of the
Constitution relevant to the particular case. More than that, however, the actual text is seen
in the context of its history, which means that debates around the drafting of a clause could
also be taken into account under certain circumstances. The second basis of justification is the
argument that the Constitution represents the will of the people of South Africa, as it is the
result of legitimate and representative negotiations. The third basis of justification is a notion
8
'e.g. in the case of Executive Council, Western Cape Legislature and others ^President of the RSA and
others CCT 27/95 where the Court invalidated proclamations issued by the President.
82A. Cockrell, "Rainbow Jurisprudence' in South African Journal on Human Rights, 12/1, 1996.
83Olympus is Dworkin's high Court entrusted with constitutional interpretation, see Law's Empire p 379.
17
of the true meaning of democracy and the Court's responsibility to protect democracy defined
in this way. The fourth basis of justification is an identification of the values underlying the
Constitution (many of which are made explicit in the text of the Constitution) as well as the
vision of a future South Africa embodied in and underlying the Constitution.
Each of these bases of justification can be identified in the judgements of the Court to date.
Although they have been discussed separately for the purposes of analysis, they are all clearly
interlinked and the discussion of the judgements that follows will reflect that. The decision
to abolish the death penalty will be used as a basis for the discussion, as it is one of the first,
most controversial and most comprehensive (each of the eleven judges wrote a separate
concurring judgement) judgements handed down by the Court. In this judgement the judges
also deal extensively with the four grounds of justification for their approach to interpretation,
their power and the content of the decision, and the judgement thus illustrates Court's
approach to the accountability vs autonomy dilemma well.
All the judges explain and justify their approach to interpretation in detail. Chaskalson P starts
his judgement with an overview of the provisions of the Constitution which he deems to be
relevant to the process of interpretation, as well as an outline of his approach to interpretation.
In this regard, he refers to the supremacy of the Constitution, and quotes from the postscript
to substantiate his view that the Constitution is aimed at establishing a new, democratic and
human rights-oriented society. He also indicates that the best approach to interpretation is one
which is "generous" and "purposive", "gives expression to the underlying values of the
Constitution", and takes into account the history and context of the Constitution84. He clearly
believes that the role of the judge in such a matter is not to merely literally interpret the text
of the Constitution, but to have regard to a wide range of external factors, including the
history, context, spirit, and goals of the Constitution, and he provides substantial evidence that
this is an internationally accepted approach to interpretation85. Both Justices Mahomed86 and
O'Regan87 echo this view when they argue that both the memory of the violent, oppressive,
authoritarian and racist past of the South African society, and the vision of a new, democratic
and egalitarian society embodied in the Constitution, should inform the process of
interpretation of the Constitution. Justice Langa88 argues that factors external to the
Constitution are of great importance in the process of interpretation, as the Constitution itself
is very much a product of its history and social context. In this regard, Langa J refers
specifically to the South African history of violence, retaliation and vengeance, and argues that
the South African state, by reason of its "role in the conflicts of the past" and its "punishments
which did not testify to a high regard for the dignity of the person and the value of every
human life", became part of the degeneration of South African society into one where "respect
for life and for the inherent dignity of every person became the main casualties". He believes
that the new Constitution provides a framework "in which a new culture must develop and take
root", and that this culture is one based on the values of a "more mature society", which






include a respect for human life and dignity. In this regard, he lays great emphasis on the
concept of "ubuntu", the achievement of which is named in the postscript of the Constitution
as one of its goals.
Justices Langa, Madala89, and Mokgoro90, all emphasise the importance of this concept as a
source of authority for the interpretation of the Constitution, as it is seen as a value
fundamental to the Constitution. Madala J believes that the concept of ubuntu "carries in it
the ideas of humaneness, social justice and fairness", and these judges argue that this is a value
fundamental to African society which has been incorporated into the Constitution and which
should therefore have an important influence on the process of interpretation.
In S v Zuma and others91, Kentridge J argues that "it cannot be too strongly stressed that the
Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean" and that ".. . regard must be
paid to the legal history, traditions and usages of the country concerned, if the purposes of its
constitution are to be fully understood". In S v Mhlungu and others91 Mahomed J argues that
literal interpretation would "negate the very spirit and tenor od the Constitution" (which
includes a "ringing and decisive break with a past which perpetuated inequality and irrational
discrimination and arbitrary governmental and executive action") and "invade" the "widely
acclaimed and celebrated objectives" of the Constitution. He insists that the Court "...must
strive to avoid such a result if the language and context of the relevant provision, interpreted
with regard to the objectives of the Constitution, permits such a course"93. In the same case,
Sachs J argues that "[w]e need to develop an appropriately South African way of dealing with
our Constitution, one that starts with the Constitution itself, acknowledges the way it came into
being, its language, spirit, style and inner logic, the interests it protects and the painful
experiences it guards against, its place in the evolution of our country..". He also argues that
interpretation will "take the form of a principled judicial dialogue" between members of
Court, with other courts, "legal profession, law schools, Parliament, and, indirectly, with the
public at large"94.
In S V Williams95 Langa J asserts that the Court has a role to play in the promotion and
development of a new culture founded on the recognition of human rights and to ensure that
the rights, "particularly of the weakest and the most vulnerable, are defended and not
ignored". He acknowledges that interpretation requires value judgements, and that these must
reflect "our own experience and circumstances as the South African community". This does
not mean that "public opinion, on its own" is determinative of constitutional issues, but that
a purposive approach to interpretation must place rights in their context, a context which
includes political negotiations, crime rates and violence.
89/A*flf, at 166-167.
9Qibid, at 202-203.
911995 (4) BCLR401 (SA) at para 17G
9 21995(7)BCLR793(CC)
9 3Ibidatpara8.
94Ibid at para 127-129.
95CCT 25/94.
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The judges also explain and justify their power to rule on these issues. In Makwanyane,
Chaskalson P argues the Court's jurisdiction in the death penalty issue, justifying the fact that
the Court, and not Parliament, as an elected body, will decide on this issue. He points out that
although the death penalty was the subject of considerable debate during the drafting of the
Constitution, the authors of the document expressly did not make specific provision for this
issue in the text, and he argues that this is a clear indication that the intention was to leave this
decision to the interpreters of the Constitution. He also emphasises that the Constitution was
the product of extensive multiparty negotiations, in order to indicate the democratic nature of
the process that led to the final document, and perhaps to argue for the idea that the
Constitutional Court, in this indirect way, does have a democratic mandate for its decisions.
Finally, he emphasises the need for the Court to approach this task with courage and
conviction, as shrinking from it would mean a return to parliamentary sovereignty96. In
several other cases, the Court has dealt with the issue of the powers of the Court and the
legislature respectively as well as the shift from parliamentary sovereignty to constitutionalism.
In Coetzee v The Government of the Republic of South Africa and others; Matiso v The
Commanding Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison and others97 the Court argued that policy choices
belong to Parliament and that it "would be invidious for us to pre-empt the issue by making
an order keeping the present system alive pending legislative modifications". In the Executive
Council of the Western Cape Legislature case, Chaskalson P emphasises the supremacy of the
Constitution, and the Constitution as the foundation for establishment of a fundamentally
different, new order. In such an order, the Court has to guard against control over legislation
passing from Parliament to the executive, but he emphasises that "our role as justices of this
Court is not to 'second guess' the executive or legislative branches of government or interfere
with affairs that are properly their concern. We have also made it clear that we will not look
at the Constitution narrowly. Our task is to give meaning to the Constitution and, where
possible, to do so in ways which are consistent with its underlying purposes and are not
detrimental to effective government".
Sachs J also emphasises the powers of parliament and central role of parliament in our
democracy. Parliament should not be seen as merely the "creature" of the Constitution, and
the limitation on delegation enforced by the Court in their judgement in this matter flows from
majesty and not impotence of parliament. He argues that legislative authority is entrusted to
parliament because "the procedures for open debate subject to ongoing press and public
criticism, the visibility of the decision making process, the involvement of civil society in
relation to committee hearings, and the pluralistic interaction between different viewpoints
which parliamentary procedure promotes, are regarded as essential features of the open and
democratic society contemplated by the Constitution". The constructive nature of the
interpretation of the Constitution is, however, emphasised by the dissenting judgement of
Madala J and Ngoepe J in which they argue that purposive interpretation would find
justification for the President's actions in this case, particularly in the context of a crisis




The Certification judgement98 also contains a comprehensive discussion of the justification of
the Court's powers. The jugement opens with the acknowledgement that M[j]udicial
^certification' of a constitution is unprecedented and the very nature of the undertaking has to
be explained. To do that, one must place the undertaking in its proper historical, political and
legal context; and, in doing so, the essence of the country's constitutional transition, the
respective roles of the political entities involved and the applicable legal principles and
terminology must be identified and described". The Court also in that judgement emphasises
that the impartiality of the decision on the certification of the Constitution is safeguarded by
the appointment and dismissal mechanisms as well as the composition and the powers of the
Court and Judicial Services Commission.
The requirement of accountability necessitates that the Court deals with the issue of public
opinion on matters before them. In Makwanyane, the judges deal with the issue of popular
opinion in detail, as the extensive public support for the death penalty formed an important
part of the retentionist argument. Chaskalson P argues that "public opinion may have some
relevance to the enquiry", but if this were to be the decisive factor, "there would be no need
for constitutional adjudication", and we would have returned to a system of parliamentary
sovereignty and retreated from the new order established by the Constitution. He points out
that the reason for establishing a system of constitutionalism was to "protect the rights of
minorities and those who cannot protect their rights adequately through the democratic
process", including the "social outcasts and the marginalised people of our society". He also
argues that only if there is "a willingness to protect the worst and the weakest amongst us",
all of us can be "secure that our own rights will be protected". If the government were the
judge of their own actions, there would be no need for a Constitution". Chaskalson P here
reveals a view of democracy as a system where the rights of individuals and minorities are
protected against the will of the majority, and which is based on a particular set of values.
All the judges addressed this issue in their judgements, and all concluded that the autonomy
of the judges of the Court from the will of the majority or public opinion is fundamental to the
successful operation of the Court. The reasons individual judges give for this conclusion do,
however, differ subtly. Firstly, Justice Kriegler's brief judgement insists that no-one's
opinion, not even his own, matters, as the task of the Court is to determine "what the
Constitution says", and that the decision should not be made on the basis of morals, ethics or
philosophy, but on the basis of law100. This argument is echoed by Justice Madala, who
asserts that it "not necessary or even desirable" to canvass public opinion on constitutional
matters", as these have to be decided on the basis of the Constitution itself101. Secondly, in
contrast to this, other judges, like Chaskalson P and Mokgoro J believe that a central element
of a constitutional democracy is the protection of minorities and the weak from the will of the







Justice Sachs'102 argument has important implications for the autonomy/accountability
dilemma. He believes that judges should "take account of the traditions, beliefs and values of
all sectors of South African society", but argues that the Constitution already reflects these
values, as it emerged from "an inclusive process in which the overwhelming majority were
represented". On this basis, the judges of the Constitutional Court have a duty to interpret the
Constitution on the basis of the values enshrined in the Constitution without regard to transient
majority opinion.
The issue of public opinion is also raised by Chaskalson P in his discussion of his decision that
the death penalty is cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment (prohibited by Section 11(2) of
the Constitution). He rejects the Attorney General's argument that this decision must be based
on the community's view of what cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment entails, and
instead argues that this must be evaluated within the meaning of the relevant section (11(2))
of the Constitution103. Whether this can ever be established purely in the constitutional sense
of these words is, however, debatable. It appears to be a decision which will inevitably be
determined by the individual judge's values. Is this appropriate in the context of an
accountable Court in a democratic dispensation ? The answer to this lies in the values assumed
to be the foundation of democracy. In the context of Chaskalson's view of democracy, the
practice of cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment (defined in the widest possible sense)
would render a society undemocratic as it would negate the values essential to a democracy.
Justice Didcott104 addresses this issue more explicitly. He argues that a decision on whether
a punishment is cruel, inhuman and degrading will always be a value judgement, but points
out that the Constitution itself does provide guidance as to the values that can be used in this
judgement. He believes that the Constitution is animated by an "altruistic and humanitarian
philosophy" which are the norms and criteria against which these kinds of issues can be
measured, and that interpretation should be true to "the civilised, humane and compassionate
society to which the nation aspires and has constitutionally pledged itself. In this way, while
Didcott clearly rejects bowing to majority opinion, he indicates that the Court can be seen as
accountable to the will of the people when it is faithful to the values incorporated into the
Constitution drafted by the people's representatives. Justice Kentridge echoes this argument
in his judgement105. Justice Mahomed106 also argues that the Constitution articulates "the
shared aspirations of a nation" and commits that nation to a new and dramatically different
future, and Justice O'Regan sees the Constitution as "a monument to this society's commitment
to a future in which all human beings will be accorded equal dignity and respect"107.
Of course, a decision that the death penalty is cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment is not








conditions. Once again, these are a matter of interpretation. The Attorney General argued
that the limitation which the death penalty places on the right not to be subjected to cruel,
inhuman and degrading punishment is reasonable and justified on the grounds that it has a
unique deterrent effect and is therefore essential in a society with a violent crime rate as high
as ours. Chaskalson P rejected this argument on the basis that the deterrence of the death
penalty has not, and probably cannot, be proven, and that it is therefore not reasonable or
justifiable within the context of an open and democratic society based on freedom and
equality108. This is, of course, a value judgement, and one that Chaskalson P makes on the
basis of his own view of democracy, freedom and equality. His legal values are evident when
he discusses one pertinent reason for declaring the death penalty unconstitutional : the fact that
it is arbitrary and unequal. His emphasis on the arguments that the imposition of the death
penalty is necessarily an arbitrary process, as our law vests wide discretion in the presiding
judge and there is an element of chance at every stage of the process, reveals his regard for
the principles of fairness and equality. He also points to argument heard by the Court on the
racial and class bias of the death penalty, and questions the possibility of ensuring equality
before the law under these circumstances. Justice Ackermann's judgement is the most vivid
reflection of these legal values, as his contribution is motivated by a belief that the element of
inequality and arbitrariness which is inevitable to the imposition of the death penalty needs
additional emphasis. He argues that the value of equality is one of the most fundamental in
the new Constitution, and that it permeates every aspect of the Constitution. The arbitrary and
unequal nature of the death penalty therefore renders it incompatible with the Constitution109.
The death penalty judgement and several of the other judgements clearly indicate that the
tension between constitutionalism and popular democracy is a major concern of the judges on
the Constitutional Court. This issue is addressed in a similar fashion by all the judges. While
they acknowledge the importance of public opinion on the matters before the Court, they insist
that the Constitution would be worthless if it did not have an autonomous body, which is not
subject to the will of the democratic majority, to guard and enforce its provisions. Their
justification for this stance lies, inter alia, in a particular view of democracy. In this view,
democracy is not merely a matter of casting a vote. It also refers to a system of basic values
of which a respect for human life and dignity are the foundation, it requires the protection of
rights essential to the successful operation of a democracy, including the rights to freedom of
expression and association, and it strives towards substantive equality of all members of that
society. The accountability of the Constitutional Court will therefore lie in its fidelity to these
values and aims, and not in a reflection of the will of the majority. They argue that the
Constitution clearly indicates its goals : democracy, freedom, equality, unity, reconciliation,
peace, and reconstruction. It also appoints the Constitutional Court as the guardian of the
Constitution, its Bill of Rights, and its goals.
The preceding discussion has indicated that this role is a problematic and controversial one
fraught with dilemmas, and that the very notion of constitutionalism embodied in the Court is
one which has an uneasy relation with the aims of popular democracy. In the light of these
factors, can the Court achieve the representivity and legitimacy it needs to enable it to play a
l 0 ! W,at l02 .
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meaningful role in the new South African democracy ? It was argued earlier that
constitutionalism can be saved from its liberal democratic connotations and reconciled with the
aims and aspirations of popular democracy. As Nolutshungu has pointed out, the discourse
of the South African liberation movement was always characterised by a strong commitment
to the notion of human rights, and it was argued earlier that popular democracy is
characterised by a commitment to social and economic equality. The South African
Constitutional Court can be accountable to the people whose struggle gave birth to it by
interpreting the Bill of Rights in a way which would promote the achievement of these aims
and in this way contribute substantially to the consolidation of democracy in South Africa. In
this conceptualisation, constitutionalism can be seen as the essence of democracy, as it
incorporates both a celebration of the values fundamental to popular democracy (including
substantive equality) and a cynicism about the abilities or commitment of a body which is, like
government, constituted for the purpose of the exercise of power, to protect those values.
South African society has recently and dramatically emerged from a brutal, authoritarian,
violent and oppressive past, and it can acutely appreciate the virtues of an opposite relationship
between law and government. An accountable and compassionate Constitutional Court will
provide the basis for the transformation of South African society into the vision articulated by
the postscript of the Constitution : "a future founded on the recognition of human rights,
democracy and peaceful co-existence and development opportunities for all South Africans,
irrespective of colour, race, class, belief or sex".
9. Is Hercules a tyrant ?"°
The Constitutional Court's judgements, discussed above, indicate that the judges address the
accountability vs autonomy dilemma by justifying their approach to interpretation or the moral
reading, their power, and the content of their decisions on four fundamental and interlinked
bases, each of which is central to Dworkin's understanding of the moral reading of a
constitution. These include the text and its context, the drafting of the Constitution, the
meaning of democracy and the Court's responsibility for it, and finally the values and vision
for the future underlying the Constitution. Dworkin argues that the moral reading of the
Constitution does not mean that judges become tyrants who, as unelected and unaccountable
rulers impose their views on the public, but that it allows a Court to give effect to the best of
a nation, its democracy and its Constitution :
"Hercules is no usurping tyrant trying to cheat the public of its democratic power. When he
intervenes in the process of government to declare some statute or other act of government
unconstitutional, he does this in the service of his most conscientious judgement about what
democracy really is and what the Constitution, parent and guardian of democracy, really
means.... if Hercules had renounced ...the responsibility to decide when he must rely on his
own convictions about his nation's character, he would have been a traitor not a hero of
judicial restraint."111
110Dworkin, Law's Empire, p 397.
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